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This study is framed against the increasingly stringent environmental demands on the pulp 
and paper industry since the late-1980s to reduce water and air pollution, and the global 
economic slowdown of the early-1990s. The primary focus of this paper is an observation-
based analysis conducted by visiting selected paper mills in Finland, the U.S., Germany and 
Sweden. I find interesting differences and similarities in the firms’ strategies in terms of how 
they responded to these changes in market conditions. Some of the observed differences lie in 
their focus on achieving (incremental) cost-efficiency gains from better management of the 
production processes, inventories, supply-chain, product distribution, and timing of 
modernization investments, including ICT. The second part of the paper presents evidence on 
firms’ productivity paths, and the heterogeneity in productivity among relatively similar 
firms. I also present selected evidence of these firms’ investments in specific areas and how 
they affected their productivity. The observation of important intra-industry differences across 
relatively similar firms lends credence to the insights provided by Denrell, Fang and Winter 
(2003) and Zott (2003), among others. The findings have implications for the study of 
organizational behavior and business strategies employed by firms to improve their 
performance and productivity under changing market conditions. We end with some 
comments on how to assess innovative activity in traditional industries such as pulp and 
paper. 
JEL Code: L00, L11, L20, L23, L25. 
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Vivek Ghosal 
School of Economics 
Georgia Institute of Technology 




I gratefully acknowledge receiving funding for this project from the Center for Paper Business and 
Industry Studies (CPBIS, an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Industry Research Center). For helpful 
comments on related versions of this paper, I thank participants at: CESifo workshop on Productivity 
and Growth (Munich, 2007); Strategic Management Society annual conference (Cologne, 2008); 
European School of Management and Technology (Berlin, 2008); workshop on “Organization and 
Performance: Understanding the Diversity of Firms” organized by Maison-Franco Japonaise (Tokyo, 
2008); Jönköping International Business School (Jönköping, 2009); and the conference on “Advancing 
the Study of Innovation and Globalization in Organizations” organized by the German Institute for 
Employment Research and the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (Nürnberg, 2009). Ghosal: Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization 
1. Motivation 
Understanding how firms respond to changes in market conditions is a key area of research in 
strategic management. In markets in a state of flux, managers will quickly need to grasp the 
complexities of the changes, assess their resource-base, form expectations of their competitors’ 
responses, evaluate the role of any rules and restrictions imposed by public policy, and act decisively 
to maintain or enhance their competitive advantage. In markets under flux, managerial cognition, 
ability to process and analyze new information, and the ability to act decisively may well be the 
difference between how the landscape looks once the dust has settled. 
  In a classic, Drucker (1995) examined a wide range of issues in this broad area and 
highlighted the role played by knowledge. Spender and Grant (1996) examined the role of 
knowledge in maintaining and gaining competitive advantage. While knowledge has many different 
facets and is relevant for myriad aspects of a firm’s operations, in the context of this paper we focus 
on knowledge as pertaining to understanding the changes in the market conditions, knowledge of the 
firm’s resource-base and operations, knowledge of various complementarities between different 
aspects of the firm’s operations, knowledge of rules and regulations that might affect the firm’s 
operations and how all this information can be processed to make optimal decisions. 
  The focus of this paper is to study the changes in the pulp and paper industry during the late-
1980s to late-1990s and examine how some of the firms in this industry responded to changes in 
market demand and supply conditions, and the environmental-regulatory changes. In the period 
under consideration, the pulp and paper industry is best treated as globally integrated in the sense 
that there were many large companies like International Paper, Stora-Enso, Weyerhauser, UPM-
Kymmene, Georgia–Pacific, Norske Skog, Abitibi, Wausau Paper, Holmen, among others, which 
competed with each other in international markets. Each of these companies sold their paper and 
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related products in several foreign destination markets. Each of these companies had complex input-
supply and product-distribution chains that threaded through different countries. 
  The early-1990s saw a worldwide economic slowdown; Table 1 presents data for the world 
real GDP growth as well as for North America and the broader EU-25. These data show a 
considerable slowdown in North American GDP growth during 1990-1992 and in the EU-25 
between 1990-1994. Since the companies produce a range of paper, packaging and paperboard 
related products, their demand is quite cyclical. The economic slowdown in the two dominant 
economic markets (North America and EU) had a marked impact on the paper industry. This 
industry is also one of the most-capital intensive in manufacturing with a single-plant costing over 
$2billion. The high fixed-costs imply significant economies-of-scale. Therefore, low demand and 
consequent market price drops can have a significantly adverse effect on profitability. From the late-
1980s and continuing through the mid-1990s, the industry saw sharp price reduction and falling 
profits. 
  The period starting in the early-to-mid 1980s also saw considerable changes in foreign 
competition (see Ghosal, 2002). Increase in containerization along with dramatic drops in shipping 
rates allowed firms to transport larger volumes to far away destination markets. The early-1990s 
global economic slowdown exacerbated these effects. As sales in existing markets dropped, 
producers of paper and related products scoured new markets to sell in as well as becoming more 
aggressive to increase sales in existing markets. European producers, for example, more aggressively 
sough to increase their presence in the U.S. markets and vice versa. 
  The industry is also subject to significant environmental regulations. As noted in Li, 
McCarthy and Urmanbetova (2004), the U.S. environmental regulations – the Clean Air and Clean 
Water Acts in the late-1960s and early-1970s – required pulp and paper companies to limit the 
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amounts of pollutants discharged into the air and water and invest in new pollution-control 
technologies. Some of the processes that were affected by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972 included mechanical pulp, non-wood chemical, secondary fiber deink, fine 
and lightweight papers from purchased pulp, and the categories of tissue, filter, nonwoven, and 
paperboard from purchased pulp. The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1980 had a marked effect on the 
industry as dioxin, chlorine and chlorine derivatives were considered hazardous waste substances 
and these wastes had to be disposed according to the federal requirements. Starting in 1995, under 
the Great Lakes Initiative, pulp and paper companies located in the eight states bordering the shores 
of the Great Lakes had to control the release of bio-accumulative industrial chemicals, pesticides, 
and metals that posed a broad range of health risks. Compliance with this initiative was expected to 
cost the companies over $1billion in new investments. Finally, the Cluster Rule started in 1993 was 
designed to integrate the Water and Air regulations into a consistent and non-exclusionary body of 
rules. The production facilities were expected to install the maximum achievable control technology. 
The estimated cost to the industry would be in the $2-2.5 billion. In Europe, particularly Northern 
Europe and Scandinavia, the environmental standards were being raised even further. One important 
difference between the U.S. and, for example, Scandinavia, was that while both had the introduction 
of significant environmental regulations, the “enforcement” standards were somewhat different 
across these jurisdictions. While the U.S has fluctuated between periods of relatively stricter versus 
lax enforcement under different political administrations, the Scandinavian countries have had 
relatively more consistent and stricter enforcement. This, as we discuss below, has implications for 
the business strategies pursued by the U.S. firms versus their European counterparts. 
  The primary focus of this paper is to examine how some of the firms responded to this new 
market reality. Section 2 briefly describes the key characteristics of the paper industry. Section 3 
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briefly comments on some data issues. In Section 4 I present the qualitative information and 
inferences from my visits to selected paper mills. Given the firms’ focus on cost-efficiency and 
productivity, in section 5 I briefly discuss linkages to some theoretical models. Section 6 examines 
data on productivity for selected multinational firms in this industry and presents cross-firm labor 
productivity regression results. In section 7 I discuss insights from the strategic management 
literature regarding differences across firms and some of the underlying explanations. Section 8 
discusses some insights for managers, and concluding remarks on measuring innovation in 
traditional industries appears in section 9. 
 
2. Industry Characteristics 
Before we delve into issues that are at the heart of firms’ strategy, we describe the nature of the 
products and technology for the firms in the pulp and paper industry. Firms in this industry typically 
produce differentiated and diversified products: (1) various types of paper such as standard writing 
paper, glossy paper, high-speed copier and printer paper, newsprint, envelopes, and other specialty 
papers; (2) pulp; (3) various types of packaging paper and materials; (4) paperboard; (5) tissues; and 
(6) wood products such as flooring and shelving materials. The process of making paper has not 
fundamentally changed in a long time. The important steps in the production process are: (1) 
debarking the timber logs, chipping and/or recycling, (2) pulp preparation, (3) paper formation, and 
(4) paper finishing. The underlying technology and the processes are reasonably standardized and 
well known. Modern papermaking, however, has evolved into a complex industry. The integrated 
papermaking machine is very costly and, at current prices, can cost between $600 million to $1 
billion. Papermaking machines are long-lived and can last for many decades. However, with newer 
and faster machines, along with improvements in waste (liquids and solids) management, the 
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meaningful life of the machine – in the sense of what it would take to stay highly competitive and 
meet the changing environmental standards – is likely to be shorter. Given the high fixed-cost, firms 
have to make careful long-run projections about the market conditions and their business strategies 
before embarking on new investments. The pulp and paper companies – like International Paper, 
Stora Enso, Weyerhaueser, Georgia Pacific, UPM-Kymmene, among others – are producers of 
various types of paper as noted above. They buy the papermaking machines from a range of 
international suppliers (e.g., Valmet, Voith, Andritz-Ahlstrom, Beloit, Groupe Laperrière & 
Verreault, among many others). In this sense, the core technologies for production of paper are 
provided by external manufacturers and are accessible to all. The technologies are developed by the 
suppliers independently as well as with considerable feedback from the paper companies (i.e., co-
developed). The paper companies, however, have some opportunity to tweak various aspects of the 
production processes, make modernization investments and engage in learning-by-doing, with the 
objective of increasing the cost-efficiency of production and gaining some productivity advantage 
over their rivals. Later, in section 5, I briefly discuss some theoretical models that provide insights 
into firms’ productivity-enhancing activities. 
  There are two noteworthy aspects of the supply-chain and its management. First, in the initial 
stages, it relates to forestry. That is, how the contracts for timber logs are structured and 
transportation of the logs to the mills. In a country like Finland, over 75% of the forests are privately 
owned and an important fraction is owned by individuals. As noted by Barsky (1999), “about one in 
five families in Finland owns a portion of the nation’s forests, a unique situation which has given the 
forest a special place in the lives of Finns – and the people a special interest in their conservation.” 
These individuals consider their trees to be their short-and-long run income. Given the relatively 
long growth-cycle of the trees, this, for example, implies that they will typically not allow the paper 
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companies to clear cut as it will affect their income in the ensuing years. Similarly in Sweden, 
private companies own close to 25% of the forests and individuals about 50%. In most other 
countries, the percentage of private, especially individual, ownerships of forests is lower. This has 
important implications for the supply-chain management by the pulp and paper companies in the 
Scandinavian versus many other countries. Second, in the final stage, it relates to contracts for 
transporting the finished paper products via truck, train and ship to destination markets. If markets 
become more volatile compared to historical standards, presence of longer-term contracts with 
transportation companies can become rather costly and burdensome. Paper mill managers will have 
to rethink all of their transportation contracts to make it more conducive to current market 
conditions. 
  Other important aspects of this industry include: 
(1) Relative lack of ability to differentiate products within a “given category” such as printer paper,  
magazine paper, among others. This is due to existing knowledge of processes and the rivals’ ability 
to relatively easily reverse-engineer the products; and 
(2) Lack of pricing power by individual firms. Given the nature of the production technology, 
market structure and market conditions, the best way to model competition in the pulp and paper 
industry is to assume Cournot quantity competition (see, for example, Pesendorfer, 2003). 
This implies that if a firm has to gain any advantage over its rivals within a given product category, 
it will have to come from the cost side. These include efficiencies that can be generated from 
changes in the firm’s organizational structure or generating production cost-efficiencies from 
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3. Data and Information 
The standard data that are available for the firms in this industry – e.g., from Compustat, Amadeus, 
Thompson’s Financials, and several sources specific to the paper industry – are rather aggregated (to 
the firm level) and appear to be inadequate to understand the complex set of issues and changes. For 
example, whether a firm reorganized its internal organizational structure, input supply-chain, or 
product distribution chain in response to changing market conditions, how it did it or what specific 
aspects of it were changed would not be discernable from these standard data sources. Given this, 
the primary focus of this paper is to provide detailed descriptions of changes and firms’ strategies 
from my visits to paper mills, and complement these with a limited amount of standard quantitative 
data. 
  My primary interest was to examine the micro-level decision- making to gain insights into 
the business strategies pursued by firms in the pulp and paper industry under the changing market 
conditions. Given this, the primary mode of analysis and information gathering was observation-
based – i.e., visiting paper mills. I visited selected paper mills in Finland, Germany, the U.S. and 
Sweden, toured their production facilities, and interviewed their production, environmental and other 
managers in order to gain insights into how they viewed the challenges and the changes they made. 
In addition, I conducted brief interviews of selected industry specialists to verify some of the 
information and gain additional insights. After having gone through this process, it seems that the 
standard data that are available for analysis are rather inadequate to address the complexity of the 
issues under consideration. Section 4 presents our inferences from the visits to paper mills. 
  The second part of the paper presents a limited amount of evidence from data and 
information that were compiled from standard sources as well as collected from industry-specific 
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sources. The data include the standard data from Compustat on the firms’ sales revenues, labor 
input, gross investments, capital stock, R&D expenditures, among others. The data also include 
firm-specific data that were collected from various issues of the industry publication Pulp and Paper 
on specific areas of investments such as ICT, digital monitoring devices, mechanicals, among others; 
these data are fully described in Ghosal and Nair-Reichert (2009). Using these data, section 6 
provides selected evidence on firms’ productivity paths. 
 
4. Visits to Paper Mills and Learning about Business Strategies 
  In this section I summarize the observations and inferences from my pulp and paper mill trips 
and draw some inferences on the firms’ responses to the changes in the economic environment. 
While I have visited pulp and paper mills in Finland, the U.S., Germany and Sweden, below I 
summarize my inferences and observations from the first two visits which are sufficient to highlight 
some of the key issues confronting the firms in these markets. 
 
4.1. Visit to a Paper Mill in Finland 
  The mill in Finland
1 was an integrated
2 pulp and paper mill that used state-of-the-art 
production processes and their primary focus was on printing and copying papers, uncoated fine 
papers, and specialty papers such as digital papers and high quality labels. Of their total production 
of printing papers, about 50% is accounted for by magazine papers and the rest by newsprint and 
fine papers. The total production capacity of the mill was close to 1 million tons of paper per year. I 
met with their production manager, environmental manager, R&D executives, labor relations 
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personnel and asked them questions regarding their operations, technologies and the changes they 
have made since the economic slowdown of the late-1980s and early-90s period. Below is a 
rendition of what I learnt. 
  They indicated that following the economic downturn of late-1980s early-1990s, they had 
instituted several major changes in how they do business. During the 1990-91 downturn, they had 
significant problems with excess production and pileup of wood inventory. During that period, they 
were forced to sell even when the market was down and prices were low. All of this was the result of 
their relatively inflexible input-procurement and transportation contracts,
3 and production. Post-
recession, they embarked on an efficiency drive; sort of, a cleansing effect of the recession.
4 An 
important future objective was to reduce production and sales when prices were low. Below I 
present some of the details. 
  They restructured their timber procurement contracts to make it more flexible so that they 
could hold less inventory of timber logs and chipped wood at the mill. Their contracts with the 
farmers (who along with the government own approx 90% percent of the forests) for timber logs 
were made a bit more flexible, allowing them to increase or decrease the supply of logs (within pre-
specified limits) reasonably quickly. Earlier, under the more inflexible and longer-term timber 
contracts, they were holding stocks of logs and chips worth about 2-3 months of input usage, and the 
timber would keep flowing in even when demand was low. According to the mill managers, this 
typically meant that even when the market was down and the selling prices were low, they were 
forced to use up the timber, produce and sell. In the 1990s, they gradually reduced the inventory to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 A non-integrated mill, for example, could only produce only paper or produce (market) pulp.  
3 Inflexible in the sense that their timber input contracts were relatively longer term. This afforded them little 
opportunity to cut costs and scale down production quickly during downturns. 
4 Ince (1999) points to some of these issues as problems for the U.S. industry. 
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about 10 days supply of chips and 4 days of logs for a total of 14 days worth of input. This was a 
sharp reduction of inventory holdings of the critical input of timber logs and chips. These changes in 
the input-procurement contracts implied that they could ramp production up or down by a significant 
percentage in a short time frame. With these changes, they mentioned that they could increase or 
decrease production by 10%-15% within a few days, allowing them to better tailor production to the 
market demand conditions. 
  Holding smaller inventory of timber logs and wood chips had dramatic effects on the 
production process. Only 14 days of inventory meant that the wood was relatively fresh and the 
fibers had not degraded. First, if the wood chips are fresh, the pulp fibers need less chemicals, 
treatment and processing (less brittle and longer fibres produce higher quality paper and require less 
chemical processing). Higher quality paper could be produced at lower cost. If the chips are older 
(sitting out in the yard, rain or shine, for months), the fibers degrade and need more chemical 
processing which raises the cost and reduces quality. To increase quality of the finished product, 
they would have to undertake more chemical processing and apply additional coating(s). Second, 
since less chemicals and processing were required with fresher wood chips, the amount of pollution 
generated at the back-end was lower. This reduces the cost of cleanup. Overall, fresher wood chips 
resulted in lower unit cost (of production and cleanup) and higher quality. In combination, these set 
of changes had an appreciable effect on the paper mill’s cost-efficiency (which includes both 
production costs as well as environmental cleanup costs). 
  At the other end of the supply-chain, they restructured their transportation contracts for 
shipping out the finished product. Earlier, they had relatively inflexible longer-term contracts. They 
changed these to make them more flexible. The mill uses both rail and truck transport; rail tends to 
be more inflexible. Under the new structure, they had a smaller core of longer-term contracts and the 
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remainder they use whatever flexibility is available in (mainly) truck and (some) rail. 
  Overall, there were dramatic changes in the entire supply-chain. Their mantra: greater 
flexibility, lower costs, and higher quality. Because of this flexibility in input procurements and 
transportation of the final product, they could now reduce production when the markets were down 
and prices low. Accordingly to the mill managers, the changes they instituted had significant impact 
on efficiency. 
  Next we turn to the production process itself. The mill managers indicated that the 
papermaking machines were available to all who could buy them, and the basic production processes 
used by various competitors were relatively common knowledge. In this sense, it was unlikely that, 
on average, the machines were a major source of advantage across producers in the key countries; if 
producers in Sweden, Germany or Finland had access to certain machines/technology, producers in 
the US, Canada and other countries would have access to it as well. There are, of course, differences 
based on vintage of machinery as well as some differences in the chemicals and processes used in 
pulping, among others. Given this, one would typically not look at differences in core technologies 
and production processes themselves to identify differences in efficiency levels and comparative 
advantage across firms in this industry, keeping in mind the capital-vintage caveat. 
  The mill managers greatly emphasized, what they termed, “de-bottlenecking” and 
incremental efficiency gains: the right amount, at the right time. De-bottlenecking refers to carefully 
examining each component of the large and complex production process and evaluating if there were 
any bottlenecks within a given unit (such as pulping or bleaching) or whether there were any general 
problems that affected the entire production process (for example, excess of chemicals or 
inappropriate chemical mix in one stage could affect the quality of the final product as well as 
increase environmental clean-up costs). They noted that by meticulously de-bottlenecking on a 
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consistent basis, they were effectively increasing production capacity by about 1.5-2% per year 
without any new capital investments. In effect, successful de-bottlenecking amounted to incremental 
innovation with resulting lowering of the firm’s cost function and generating higher output in 
equilibrium. The mill managers indicated that the incremental efficiency enhancements saved them 
between 5%-10% per year in terms of operating costs. They viewed this as vital to the firm’s 
survival and competitive edge in the longer-run. The cost efficiency gains, which arose from 
chemicals, mixing and process improvements, were viewed as critical since new capital investments 
were typically very expensive.  
  In the area of information and communication technology (ICT), there was dramatic 
evidence. Side-by-side, in one building they had an older pulp and paper mill that produced 
uncoated, relatively basic, paper. In the adjoining building, they had their newest machine which 
produced their flagship products which included high-speed printing and specialty papers. Around 
the older machine, there was much greater labor activity – people trying to monitor and fix things – 
and less computerization. For the newer machine, almost everything – entry of wood chips into the 
system, pulping, mixing of chemicals, etc – was controlled via centralized computer terminals 
networked with digital cameras and digital monitoring and recording devices. Each stage of the 
production process could be monitored closely via these terminals. Workers in charge of monitoring 
and adjusting the systems, had a lot of discretionary power to “fix” problems, which included 
significantly changing the machine speeds and even shutting it down if needed. The production 
managers mentioned that such decentralization in decision-making was necessary in order to avoid 
production slowdowns and stoppages. To make this operational, they had to train specific workers to 
operate and manage this integrated ICT system. They incurred significant training costs and time – 
over a year of training for each of the individuals who would operate the integrated system. Their 
 
  13 Ghosal: Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization 
mill managers boasted that “... we may have the most trained and skilled labor force in the whole 
industry.” Incorporating ICT into the production process also meant that problems in the production 
line could be spotted faster, a better diagnosis made faster, and the decision to slow down the 
process was made faster. Faster identification and fix for the problem meant that there was less 
degraded (due to glitches in the production process) paper coming out at the end. Overall, 
computerization and technical change was obvious, the human-capital embodied in their workforce 
seemed high and the efficiency gains were palpable. 
  To make the induction of ICT and other changes work better, they instituted an incentive 
program for labor. Workers are encouraged to report their ideas about improving productivity and 
lowering costs to management. They had a carefully-crafted mechanism for determining the merit of 
these suggestions and appropriately rewarding the workers, if the suggestions were accepted and 
incorporated. These were designed to keep them a step-ahead of their competition and improve 
worker productivity and morale. 
  In terms of complimentary resources, they placed much greater emphasis on in-house energy 
generation. It is useful to keep in mind that pulp and paper production is highly energy-intensive.  
They argued that this would produce significant cost-saving in the longer-run. The payback period 
for going in-house on energy was about 4-5 years and, therefore, having in-house energy generation 
was a bargain in the longer-run.  
  Finally, there were significant changes in management-labor relationships. After the 1990-91 
downturn, it became clear they had to reorganize. Labor unions in Finland are very strong and 
initially resisted the management’s approach to reduce labor, increase capital-intensity, incorporate 
more ICT and modernize. However, after a prolonged period of negotiations (between 4-5 years) and 
impressing on the unions that modernization was vital to the firm’s survival, they succeeded in 
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making the changes. There were minimal layoffs, and the future growth of the firm would come 
from growth of capital and technology and not additional labor. They achieved their optimal targets 
for labor by attrition – not replacing many of those who retired. At the time of my visit, the mill 
managers said that they had bottomed out on the labor-saving aspect; i.e., in the near term, no further 
gains are possible in this dimension. To put it differently, capital-and-technological intensity 
appeared to be at their peaks. 
 
A key theme from my mill visit in Finland 
  The mill executives in Finland noted that producers in the industry typically have little 
pricing power. Further, gaining pricing power through product differentiation was difficult as 
imitating a competitor’s new paper products was generally not difficult. All of this implied that, to 
be profitable, one had to be efficient and reduce costs. 
  The mill managers had a single-minded focus on incremental innovations and efficiency 
enhancements: the right amount at the right time! They were not searching for the big-bang 
technological improvements that would put them ahead of their competitors. But a lot of attention 
was paid to making the existing machinery and processes work better. They thought through the 
various complementarities in the production processes and supply-chain on a regular basis and were 
determined to tweak even small amounts of extra output from the existing machines. The mill 
managers commented that their US counterparts typically did not focus as much on incremental cost 
efficiency enhancements during the 1990s. They said the US manufacturers were starting to do this 
now, but they felt that the US efforts to catch up on efficiency may be a too little too late.
5 
                                                           
5 In a related context, some of the issues highlighted in section are noted in McNutt (2002, p.13) as challenges 
for the U.S. producers in an increasingly global marketplace for the pulp and paper industry. See, for 
example, the discussion related to employee training and development, workplace transformation, capital 
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  Finally, the big beast: environmental regulation. Finland has tough environmental standards. 
And these high hurdles were getting even higher. In part, the mill managers saw some of the changes 
described above, like using fresher wood chips and less chemicals, as contributing to significant 
improvements in their environmental efficiency. Rather than fight the regulators and the system, 
they decided to go to the other extreme and modernized their plants, restructured the supply chain 
and exceed the environmental standards. The mill managers noted that this has paid significant 
dividends in their production efficiency, relationship with local communities, and federal and local 
environmental regulators. Portraying the right “environmental image” to the public and regulators 
was a very important part of their business strategy. In trying to attain or exceed the environmental 
standards in Finland, they succeeded in making significant gains in production efficiency, giving 
them a leg-up on some of their rivals. In part, this looks like a story of how regulation may help 
improve firms’ competitive advantage. 
 
4.2. Visit to a Paper Mill in the U.S. 
  The integrated pulp and paper mill I visited in the U.S. produced a range of fine white paper 
including copier paper, business forms, envelopes and writing materials. The mill had two 
papermaking machines that made medium and light weight paper. One started early-1980s. The 
second in early-1990s. The total investment cost was close to $1.5 billion. (To be clear, this 
investment is for one mill.) 
  At the planning stage, it was recognized that future environmental standards would become 
more stringent. This consideration was built in during the construction phase and cost approximately 
5%-6% of the total investment. The mill incorporated advanced water treatment and waste disposal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
spending efficiencies, global supply chains, among others. 
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facilities. The mill also had co-generation of electricity with over 70% of its energy requirements 
being generated in-house. The mill manager noted that if they did not build in these superior 
environmental control processes at the time of construction, but had to modify the mills later, the 
costs would be substantially more: roughly three-four times higher. They indicated that modifying 
older mills to meet new environmental standards is very costly. 
  With regard to transportation of the final product: about 20% rail; 75% truck; 5% smaller 
vehicles (this was expected to increase to about 10% to increase flexibility to serve local and 
regional customers). They indicated that rail is very inefficient. Truck and other smaller vehicles can 
deliver on-time at short notice. The mill manager noted that this was important for establishing good 
buyer-seller relationships. 
  The economic downturn late-1980s to early-1990s resulted in significant excess supply of 
paper in the market, resulting in lower prices and profits. All companies were hurting. The mill 
manager described it as the “big squeeze.” This resulted in suppliers looking for newer markets to 
sell and opened up global markets. The mill manager noted two issues that producers needed to 
focus on: (a) look for buyers outside their traditional markets; and (b) be aware of foreign producers 
attempting to enter local markets. To protect their local and traditional markets, the mill paid greater 
emphasis on buyer-seller relationships, price competition and quality control (high quality as well as 
consistency of quality across different orders). Since the mid-1990s, there was need for greater 
awareness of foreign suppliers who may enter the producer’s market. 
  The mill manager noted that for his mill, the traditional focus was on inventory management. 
Under the changing market conditions, the focus on inventory management was reduced, and much 
greater emphasis was put on process and supply management. In a nutshell, the whole focus shifted 
to short-term demand-supply matching. 
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  Since the late-to-mid-1990s, the mill placed greater emphasis on incremental innovation and 
de-bottlenecking to stay competitive and reduce costs. Given the relatively long-lasting and 
expensive nature of capital (paper mills), the mill manager noted that improvements in cost-
efficiency would have to come in the form of incremental improvements. 
  In terms of R&D expenditures as traditionally defined, there is very little. Instead, a lot of it 
involves tweaking existing processes to extract greater output and increase efficiency. The mill 
managers indicated that close to one-thirds of their technical staff devote significant amounts of time 
on such incremental process innovations. The mill manager offered two quantitative measures: (a) 
he indicated that 1-2% of revenues go towards activities in the area of cost efficiency enhancements; 
and (b) in terms of gains in output of paper, these efficiency enhancements had resulted in 
approximately 1.25%-2% per year growth in production. This may not seem overwhelming in any 
given year, but the compounded effect on cost efficiency and production gains can be significant in 
the longer run. 
  Their typical inventory holding of timber logs and wood chips was about 3 weeks; down 
from 2 months or more some years back. Timber was mainly trucked in using independent 
contractors. They indicated some inflexibility due to the work-schedules of these contractors (who 
worked 4 days/week). The mill manager noted that they could store timber logs and wood chips in 
moist climate-controlled conditions to minimize the effects of aging of the wood chips and fibers. 
  Due to increased computerization, worker training and human-capital has increased. Cameras 
and other electronic devices monitor production processes which the workers can keep track from 
computer terminals. Workers have leeway in addressing problems as they occur. 
  The particular US mill I visited was non-unionized. The mill manager noted that this was a 
big advantage for his mill compared to many other mills which were unionized. The company 
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provides worker incentives. The focus is more on teamwork rather than individuals. If worker-teams 
suggest cost-saving innovations which are eventually adopted, workers receive some financial 
rewards. 
 
4.3 Comparing the Mill Visits 
  I present a comparison from the mills I visited in Finland and the U.S.
6 The important 
similarities and differences were: 
(1) Managers at both mills emphasized that following the economic downturn of the 1990s, 
restructuring of the supply-chain and better process-management were essential to stay competitive. 
These included changes in the inventory holdings of logs and wood chips, emphasis on de-
bottlenecking of the production process, offering workers incentives to be more productive, 
incorporating modernization via information technology investments for better process and overall 
business management, training their workers to ensure they could fully reap the benefits of the 
newer technologies including ICT, and restructuring transportation contracts. 
(2) An important difference was that the mill in Finland did not have climate controlled storage for 
wood chips. The US mill had fairly advanced climate-controlled storage. The Finnish mill relied on 
timely delivery of logs to minimize decay of wood fibers. The end result appeared to be similar, but 
with very different mechanisms of getting to it. 
(3) Both mills had relatively newer machines that were efficient at high production volume and met 
or exceeded environmental standards. The mills were clean, appeared to be efficiently managed, had 
a high level of ICT investments, and had made a number of organizational changes to meet changing 
                                                           
6 The mill I visited in Germany was rather different and was undergoing significant changes to increase 
productivity, replace outdated machinery and implement changes in the organizational structure. The 
mills I visited in the U.S. and Finland were the high-efficiency models the German mill was trying to 
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market conditions. 
(4) While both appeared to emphasize de-bottlenecking and incremental cost-efficiency gains as key 
to survival, the production and mill managers in Finland emphasized this as their mantra. At every 
step of the way during my visit, they kept emphasizing how this “incremental attitude” had been 
ingrained into their management teams and workers. The US mill manager seemed somewhat less 
focused on this. He commented that “ ... we are getting around to doing this in a more effective 
manner...” 
(5) Both said that gains in output due to cost-efficiency enhancements  appear to be in the 1.25%-2% 
per year range. This was somewhat surprising given that it was coming from mills that were 
geographically so far apart and that there were several important differences in the nature of the 
changes the mills had made. 
(6) The US mill manager was very focused on buyer-seller relationships. He noted that from his 
vantage point, price was not often the primary determinant in making a sale. Right quality, 
consistency of quality, on-time delivery, and attending to the “businesses idiosyncratic needs” were 
very important. In my discussions, the mill managers Finland did not bring up this issue at all.  Their 
main, and consistent, comments were that they had little pricing power and had to rely on quality 
and cost-efficiency to stay competitive. 
(7) The mill in Finland was unionized. The US mill was not. The former laid enormous emphasis on 
union-management relationships and how negotiating the introduction of new technologies and 
reducing employment via retirements was critical to their change in fortunes in the 1990s. 
(8) The mill in Finland restructured their timber procurement contracts to make input supplies more 
flexible. One of the important points was to put in fresher wood chips into the production process. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
follow. 
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The US mill manager did not talk much about timber procurement contracts. Instead, he talked about 
climate controlled storage for timber logs and wood chips. End result: fresher wood chips into the 
production process. It is not clear to me how these differential strategies affect their costs. My gut 
sense was the US mill had to incur higher costs of climate controlled inventory.  
(9) There appears to be some differences in the  tax codes between US and Finland which allows the 
latter to make costly modernization investments – in particular greener technologies – on a more 
consistent basis. If so, this would be important in maintaining and enhancing efficiency. This came 
up only briefly during my conversations and I could not get a proper sense of the differences in the 
tax codes. 
(10) The US mill complained about being constrained by “Wall Street considerations” when making 
large investments of the sort required to upgrade to newer mills or make costly modernization 
investments. The managers of the mill in Finland did not consider this to be a problem; they said that 
European stock markets are more forgiving of such investments. If so, this could potentially affect 
the long-run competitiveness, productivity and profitability of the industry. Super fast machine 
speed and width are the hallmark of the modern generation of papermaking machines. The US mill 
manager lamented: “ ... at one time the Americans had all the biggest and fastest machines. Now 
others increasingly have them ...” 
 
5. Linkages to Some Theoretical Models 
  One of the themes that emerged from my visits to the paper mills was the firms’ focus on 
implementing a range of solutions (described in section 4) that would provide gains in cost-
efficiency and increase productivity. Aside from my own inferences from the mill trips, evidence 
indicates that there have been relatively little “major” technological change in the industry over the 
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last couple of decades. Whatever changes have occurred have been primarily driven by 
environmental regulation. In the context of bleaching technologies, see Norberg-Bohm and Rossi 
(1998) for a discussion of how the industry has responded to this challenge. They note (p.237-38) 
that, due to the nature of EPA’s balancing of costs and benefits in regulatory decision making and 
other factors, most of the technological advances have been “relatively incremental and radical 
transformation is rare.” The paper and pulp industry employs myriad technologies ranging from 
those embedded in physical plant and equipment to those in different pulping processes. The 
technical life of paper machines, for example, appears to be in the 20-30 year range and investment 
costs are extremely high making it somewhat difficult to rapidly induct new technologies. In view of 
this, it may be particularly important to evaluate the role of incremental innovations which lead to 
gains in cost-efficiency and profitability. For the first half of the 1990s, Bjorkman, Paun and Jacobs 
Young (1997, p.80) note that most investments by U.S. and Canadian firms were typically not for 
new production capacity, but on incremental increases in production efficiency. 
  In this section I briefly discuss two classes of theoretical models that help focus our 
understanding of the firms’ cost-efficiency and productivity-enhancing activities. 
 The  first model described is a standard model of quantity competition. From my observation 
from the mill visits and review of the paper markets, two important features emerged. One, the 
products within each category – e.g., plain paper, different types of glossy paper, newsprint, etc, – 
are best treated as relatively homogenous. While there are some differences, these differences are 
not likely to persist over time: the characteristics of a particular type of paper can be reverse-
engineered relatively easily and imitated by at least all the major players in the market. Therefore 
differences in attribute or quality across the firms are likely to evaporate relatively quickly.
7 
                                                           
7 Note that smaller firms can exist in these markets (for example, Sweden’s Munksjö AB) that either serve 
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Pesendorfer (2003), for example, strongly argues in favor of product homogeneity within a category. 
Two, based on my interviews with several managers, there did not appear to be a case where the 
firms in this industry were engaging in price-setting behavior. Several of the industry studies have 
mentioned how the firms had little/no pricing power and, in the 1980s and 1990s, were embarking 
on a path of increased M&As to try and reduce capacity via plant closures post-merger. As has been 
discussed in the industry literature, this strategy too failed in part due to the overcapacity being too 
large to begin with, along with new entry of Australian, South American and Asian firms. 
  Given this, it seems best to characterize this industry as one with quantity competition with 
relatively homogenous products (within a category, as noted above), and an N-firm Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. Pesendorfer (2003) who examines M&As in this industry, models competition in 
capacities as one-shot Cournot. Given a production function (a la Dixit, 1980), we can think of a 
proportionality between a firm’s capacity, ki, and output, qi. To illustrate the issues, consider a static 
Cournot setting with three firms. Let the i
th firm face a constant marginal cost ci and market demand 
is given by   where total market output  , bQ a P − = ) ( 3 2 1 q q q Q + + = . Solving for the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium, we get the equilibrium output for firm 1:  ,
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q  and the three firms will have equal market share of 1/3. Now let firm 1 be successful 
 




  23 Ghosal: Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization 
in achieving some gains in production efficiency due to learning-by-doing or reconfiguring it 
supply-chain or making critical modernization investments at the right time to upgrade its production 

















π . This implies that if firm 1’s marginal cost c1 decreases, its equilibrium output and profits 
increase relative to its rivals. The intuition is that the best-quantity-response-function of the firm that 
achieved a cost-efficiency gain shifts to the right, giving it, in the new equilibrium, greater output 
sold, higher market share and profits compared to its rivals. 
  In this quantity-setting game, even small gains in cost-efficiency will translate into potential 
gains in output, market share and profitability. If these efficiency gains can be sustained and not 
mimicked by rivals – as could be the case for idiosyncratic firm-specific learning-by-doing, 
reorganization of supply-chain and production processes – they could form the basis of at least some 
persistence in efficiency and performance differences across firms in the short-to-medium run. To 
illustrate this point, it is useful to think about the marginal costs for each firm being given by: 
 where ‘i’ indexes the firm and ‘t’ indexes time (t=0,1,2,3...) and ci,t is the marginal 
cost for firm i at time t. On the right hand side, c0 is a constant and θ is a parameter that indexes 
technological change – as indicated by increases in cost efficiency – with θ≥1. In the exponent of θ, 
gi represents a fraction ( ) indicating the gains in cost-efficiency. As we move forward in time, 
the MC curve for a firm, ci,t, will drift down due to potential learning-by-doing effects, adoption of 
new processes, and making new investments in modernization, among other factors, which improves 
cost-efficiency and productivity. Since gi is firm-specific, firms can achieve differential rates of cost-
efficiency gains; the higher is gi the faster will that firm’s MC drift down. In the Cournot model, a 
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time compared to its rivals and, ceteris paribus, will see increase in market share. This result 
corresponds to our analysis for differential cost-efficiencies across firms and the market outcomes 
related to quantities, profits and market shares. 
 The  second class of models relate to those that highlight incremental innovation and cost 
efficiency gains. The literature on innovation has extensively analyzed the role of major and 
incremental innovations. Major innovations play a role in birth of products and dramatic changes in 
the competitive landscape. Such changes are, however, infrequent. Incremental innovations, which 
can arise from learning-by-doing, are more frequent and can play a significant role in firms’ year-to-
year strategic decisions. As is standard in this literature, the incremental innovations generate 
incremental gains in cost efficiency. Regarding incremental gains in cost-efficiency that arise from 
learning-by-doing and ongoing improvements, Gort and Klepper (1982, p.634) state that these 
changes compresses the profit margins of the less efficient producers who are unable to imitate the 
leaders. The market shares and profitability of the less efficient firms will fall and may eventually 
lead to their exit. This is viewed as a slow process that unfolds over many years with only the fittest 
surviving. 
  Several papers build on the above theme and provide additional insights; e.g., Klepper and 
Graddy (1990), Klepper (1996) and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994). These models assume: (1) a 
distribution of production efficiencies across the firms; (2) improvements in production efficiency 
levels due to learning-by-doing and imitation; and (3) a low probability of successful innovations. 
Each time-period gives rise to opportunities to lower unit production cost and the successful firms 
enjoy better profit-margins. These improvements in production efficiency result in downward 
pressure on prices over time. The next step in these models can be thought of an exit from the 
industry or a process of mergers and acquisitions. Overall, these theories provide an understanding 
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of the linkages between the firms’ incremental cost-efficiency enhancing activities and profitability; 
see Audretsch (1995) and Ghosal (2008) for additional discussion of some of these models. 
 
6. Examining Productivity 
  In this section I examine data on productivity for selected multinational firms in this industry. 
The objective here is not to conduct extensive formal statistical analysis, but simply to take a broad 
look at the data, examine the patterns and assess the differences across firms. 
  Table 2 presents the data on capital-labor ratios, labor productivity and stock prices. The 
table is grouped into two categories of companies: Group A and Group B. It is important to note that 
most of the companies are large and diversified, producing a variety of paper, packaging, and wood 
products. In addition, some companies specialize in the production of various tissue papers and 
consumer hygiene products. Some even produce various types of chemicals. Even within those firms 
classified as primarily producing pulp and paper, there is variation in terms of basic paper, various 
types of finished paper, specialty papers such as those for specific types of packaging and tobacco 
papers, among others. This is not a homogenous group: the companies offer products that are highly 
differentiated as well as diversified. With this caveat, “Group A” consist of companies that focus 
more on various types of paper, pulp, some packaging, and related wood products. “Group B” 
contains a more diverse set of companies that specialize in one or more of the following products: 
packaging, paperboard, tissues, selected building materials, market pulp, timber products. While 
some of the companies in Group A produce products common to Group B – e.g., packaging, timber 
products, etc – they form a “relatively” more comparable group as opposed to those in Group B. 
Given the size and scope of the companies, it is not possible to create a group of companies that 
produce only pulp and paper. It is important to note that while there are differences between the 
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firms in Group A and Group B, there are significant common papermaking technologies employed 
by all of the firms in Group A and Group B. 
  The data are from the Compustat files and selected other sources to obtain data on exchange 
rates and company stock prices. The summary statistics presented are the mean (standard deviation) 
from five-years of data over 1994-1998. This period was chosen as it allowed me to get data for 
most of the firms; using earlier years would have resulted in several companies being dropped from 
the sample. This period is also a good one as the global markets had emerged from a slowdown and 
reflected relatively normal to good economic conditions. Of the 27 companies listed in Table 2, 17 
are from the US and 5 from Canada. This is largely an artifact of better data availability from the 
Compustat databases for North American companies. Quite a few of the foreign firms listed in the 
Compustat Global databases had a significant number of missing observations and therefore could 
not be used for analysis. 
  Labor productivity is measured by dividing the company’s real sales by the total number of 
employees on an annual basis. Labor productivity is one of the commonly used measures of firms’ 
cost efficiency with there being a direct relationship between the two: i.e., if a firm’s labor 
productivity is increasing, its unit production cost is falling and cost efficiency is increasing. Multi-
factor productivity (or total factor productivity, TFP) is a more complete measure, but the Compustat 
does not provide data (e.g., on materials and energy usage) to compute such a measure. The data for 
the Group A sample of companies show that labor productivity varies from a low of $106,000 per 
worker to a high of $186,000. Looking at column 1 on capital-labor ratios, we observe significant 
differences across companies. For the companies in Group B, labor productivity varies between a 
low of $82,000 to a high of $144,000. As in Group A, there is considerable variation in the capital-
labor ratio across the companies. The comparisons of the average stock-price over the five-year 
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period are illustrative; unfortunately we were not able to obtain historical stock price data for some 
of the companies. 
  To get a better perspective, let us first compare three companies: International Paper, 
Weyerhaueser, and Georgia-Pacific. All three are US companies and have relatively similar profiles. 
The average labor productivity numbers for the three are $141,000, $184,000 and $171,000 
respectively. The latter two numbers are closer, but labor productivity for International Paper is 
about 17% to 23% lower. Second, consider the following four companies: Norske Skog Canada, 
Wausau Paper, Badger Paper Mills, and Schweitzer Mauduit. These four are listed as producing only 
pulp and paper. Therefore, they are relatively more comparable. The labor productivity numbers are 
$151,000, $171,000, $123,000 and $106,000, respectively. Again showing considerable variation 
across firms. 
  The main point is that the raw data on labor productivity shows considerable differences 
across relatively comparable companies. 
  Economic production theory shows that the capital-labor ratio will be an important 
determinant of labor productivity. The intuition is that if a firm uses more capital per unit of labor, 
then this company should produce more output per unit of labor. The basic relationship can be seen 
from a standard Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
, ) 1 (
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where “i” denotes the firm subscript, A is an index of the firm’s technology, q, L and K are the 
firm’s output, employment and capital stock. The coefficients α and β are the shares of labor and 
capital in production. A complete specification of the firm’s production function would include other 
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important inputs the firm uses, such as various materials (wood, chemicals, etc), energy, and services 
(e.g., transportation of timber logs and finished product). But, as we noted earlier, the Compustat 
does not provide such detailed data on inputs. For simplicity, let us assume (α+β)=1, or constant 
returns-to-scale. Dividing equation (1) throughout by L, and using β=(1-α) from above and taking 
natural logarithms (denoted by ℓn) we get: 
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where ℓn denotes natural logarithm, and the dependent variable is the firm’s labor productivity  Our 
data in Table 2 are from a cross-section of firms. To go from (2) to a cross-firm regression we can 
estimate, we specify:  ), ( i i A A η + =  where ‘A’ reflects the common elements of technology across 
the firms and ηi the idiosyncratic, firm-specific, component. The cross-firm regression we estimate 
using the data presented in Table 2 is given by: 
 
















⎛ l l l  
 
In (3), εi is the firm-specific regression error, where:  ). ( i i i η υ ε + =  As noted before, ηi is the firm-
specific idiosyncratic component of technology, and υi includes any other omitted (from the 
regression) factors that influence the firm’s labor-productivity. 
  It is quite obvious that the number of observations in Table 2 is low, and this is a  limitation. 
However, we note that the firms in our sample are “relatively” similar in the sense that most of them 
use very similar production technologies, equipment and machinery, timber and chemicals in the 
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production process, and are highly energy-intensive. In short, we do not have large heterogeneity in 
our sample as would be the case if it included Microsoft, Toyota, Johnson & Johnson, and 
International Paper. In this sense, our smaller sample size is relatively less of a handicap.  
  To be clear, I present these results to take a quick look at the data. Using the data presented 
in Table 2, we present estimates from specification (5). This regression will reveal how much of the 
difference in labor-productivity across the firms will remain after we control for the capital-labor 
ratio, arguably one of the most important determinants. The estimated equation using the Group A 
sample is (standard errors in parentheses): 
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and the estimated equation using both Group A and Group B data is: 
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Given the standard errors, the estimated coefficients are statistically the same for the two 
regressions. As expected, this signals that many of the underlying technological relationships are 
similar across these firms. Since the equation is estimated in log-linear form, the estimate on (K/L) is 
the elasticity: it indicates that a 10% increase in the capital-labor ratio leads to approximately a 2.5% 
increase in the firm’s labor-productivity. The regressions – using the adjusted-R
2 values – explain 
less than 40% of the variation in labor-productivity across this sample of firms. This implies that 
more than 60% of the variation in labor productivity across the firms in our sample remains 
unexplained by the above baseline regression which is derived from standard economic production 
theory. Some of this is due to the idiosyncratic technological and cost-efficiency differences across 
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the firms as captured by ηi in the error term. The balance is due to the effect of omitted variables, as 
captured by υi in the error term. Unfortunately, the Compustat database does not contain detailed 
information on the firms’ other important inputs such as materials and energy, which would be 
needed for a thorough examination. 
  To provide a glimpse of some of the other factors, Ghosal and Nair-Reichert (2009) examine 
the impact of the firms’ investments in mechanical, digital and chemicals area on their labor 
productivity. The results in this paper, for example, reveal that:
8 
•  A firm that has a one-standard-deviation larger number of investment transactions in the 
“Mechanical” category (relative to the mean number of such transactions across firms) has 
$13,450 higher labor productivity. The mechanical category includes any investment in 
mechanical equipment and machinery (but not ICT).  
•  A firm that has a one-standard-deviation larger number of investment transactions in the 
“Digital” category (relative to the mean number of such transactions across firms) has 
$15,520 higher labor productivity. The digital category includes investments in digital 
recording, monitoring and quality control devices, and software. 
An important conclusion from that paper is that these (modernization) investments meaningfully add 
to firm-level productivity and help explain some of the observed differences in efficiency across 
firms. 
   Finally, Figures 1a-1d display the time-series data on labor productivity for some of the 
firms noted in table 2. Figure 1a contains data for three of the bigger US firms, Figure 1b on some 
other US firms, and Figures 1c and 1d on selected Canadian and Scandinavian firms. These data 
                                                           




  31 Ghosal: Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization 
show that: 
•  Not only are there productivity differences across firms, the differences seem somewhat 
persistent over the sample period. Consider, for example, the differences between 
International Paper and Georgia Pacific (in Fig 1a), and UPM-Kymmene and Stora Enso (in 
Fig 1d). 
•  There are interesting intertemporal movements (convergence and divergence) of labor 
productivity as we compare across firms. Consider, for example, the productivity paths 
between Norske Skog Canada and Abitibi (in Fig 1c), and between Weyerhauser and 
International Paper (in Fig 1a). 
  Overall, keeping the data limitations and the small number of observations in mind, the data 
in Table 2 – whether we eyeball it or conduct some simple statistical analysis – and Figures 1a-1d 
point to significant differences in the levels labor productivity (and, consequently, cost efficiency) 
across the firms in this industry, as well as important differences in the intertemporal dimension. 
 
7. Insights from the Strategic Management Literature 
  What factors might lead to the observed differences in labor productivity across the sample 
of firms in Table 2? There are alternative streams of thought in the Resource Based View literature 
regarding whether differences across firms – in measures of productivity, performance, etc – can 
exist and persist. Denrell, Fang and Winter (2003), Dierickx and Cool (1989) and Zott (2003), for 
example, present a convincing set of arguments that firms are presented with a range of potential 
strategic opportunities by which they can distance themselves from their rivals, that idiosyncratic 
non-tradable assets exist and are important, and differences can occur and persist across firms. 
  Denrell, Fang and Winter (2003) argue that a crucial missing element in the resource 
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valuation story are the “idiosyncratic information and capabilities” of an individual firm. They note: 
“in a changing environment, there is continuing renewal of each firm’s view of the 
opportunities that are differentially suited to it, even without explicit effort to this end by the 
firm itself. Whether the opportunities seen are actually seized is, however, an important 
question. We argue that the discovery of a valuable strategic opportunity is often a matter of 
‘serendipity’ in the strict sense – not just luck, but effort and luck joined by alertness and 
flexibility.”  “The range of things that have not been tried is simply too vast. If some areas 
are mined out, while in others the valuable claims are carefully staked and guarded, it is not 
because there is no virgin territory to search. It is because the searchers stay within the 
fences of their ideas, particularly their shared ideas.” “When a firm has assembled many of 
the necessary resource components, it may be able to see that these resources could be 
valuable if complemented with some others. As a result, the search for the last components 
will be intentional rather than serendipitous.” 
 
  The arguments presented by Dierickx and Cool (1989) lend credence to the view that there 
exists a class of non-appropriable resources whose values are difficult to identify and could give rise 
to a set of strategic opportunities. They discuss the role of “resource bundles” which need to be 
recognized and deployed to achieve or protect a firm’s market position. They note that “managers 
often fail to recognize that a bundle of assets, rather than the particular product market combination 
chosen for its deployment, lies at the heart of their firm's competitive position.” Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen (1997) note that the competitive advantage of firms may rest on distinctive processes such as 
ways of coordinating and combining, shaped by firm-specific assets such as the firm’s portfolio of 
difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and complementary assets. These could be highly idiosyncratic 
knowledge that firms acquire via internal learning-by-doing which other forms may find hard to 
imitate. 
  In the context of our study, the notions of the accumulation of “strategic asset stocks” as well 
as the “interconnectedness of asset stocks” could be particularly important in understanding 
differences across firms in the pulp and paper industry. As noted in section 2, the major technologies 
in the pulp and paper industry (e.g., paper making machine, bleaching, drying, collandering and 
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other units) are, in principle, accessible to all the firms. The production process itself is very 
complicated and requires a high level of engineering knowledge and understanding of each of its 
components as well as how the different components fit together. Supply-chain management is very 
important in making sure that the paper mill gets the right inputs, of the right quality and at the right 
time. My experiences in talking with mill managers and industry consultants revealed that there is a 
continuous attempt – at least by some firms – to try and figure out how to tweak various 
combinations in the production process to coax additional cost-efficiencies. While some of this may 
(eventually) be known and imitated by particular players in the industry, some of it inevitably is 
unique to each firm. This stock of knowledge incrementally builds up and, in the longer-run, may 
present a firm with unique opportunities to be more efficient and profitable. To those who say that 
since the processes and products in this industry are relatively well known, how can one firm gain an 
advantage over others? The answer, in part, lies at the range of possibilities that potentially exist. In 
the words of Denrell, Fang and Winter: “the range of things that have not been tried is simply too 
vast.” 
  The other insight provided in the strategy literature comes from the work of Zott (2003). The 
central question Zott seeks to answer is: “Why do firms in the same industry perform differently?”  
In a sense, this question goes to the heart of what we are attempting to figure out in this paper, and 
the data in Table 2 and Figures 1a-1d clearly reveal stark differences. After a lucid review of the 
literature, Zott formulates three central propositions: 
Proposition 1: Differential timing of resource deployment fosters the emergence of intra-
industry differential firm performance. 
Proposition 2: Differential costs, associated with the deployment of resources, foster the 
emergence of intra-industry differential firm performance. 
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Proposition 3: Learning how to deploy resources, both directly and indirectly, fosters the 
emergence of intra-industry differential firm performance. 
  If we combine the insights of Denrell, Fang and Winter (2003), Dierickx and Cool (1989) 
and Zott (2003), one could argue that given a potentially large range of possibilities for improvement 
that are idiosyncratic to the firms, and the effect of timing, cost and implementation of changes, 
there could emerge meaningful differences across firms even within a relatively well-defined 
industry, with the main players making similar products, and having access to the same core set of 
technologies and resources. When faced with changing market conditions, some of the key 
ingredients for maintaining or enhancing the firm’s competitive advantage would appear to be 
knowledge of the changes, ability to forecast the new direction of the markets, knowledge of the 
internal processes, and implementing a set of optimal solutions in a timely manner. 
  Overall, the significant differences in productivity we observed across the firms in Table 2, 
tie in to the insights of Denrell, Fang and Winter (2003) and Zott (2003) that there may be numerous 
idiosyncratic firm-specific considerations that may result in intra-industry differences in productivity 
and performance across firms. 
 
8. Market Conditions, Organizational Behavior, and Insights for Managers 
  My inferences from the visits to the paper mills and some of the data-based analysis reveal 
considerable differences across firms in the dimensions of productivity and performance. The big 
question is: Why might these differences arise? Below are some insights. 
(1) There appear to be differences between the firms in their focus, knowledge about the 
complementarities among various aspects of the production process and supply-chain management, 
perceptions about the changes in the markets, emphasis on the long-run versus shorter-run, and 
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extent of organizational changes made. 
(2) There appears to be differences across firms in their knowledge and their ability to made 
incremental changes to the production processes and supply-chain to generate gains in production 
efficiency. This appears to be a central finding of our analysis, and links the issues of knowledge 
about processes, complementarities in various aspects of the firms resources, timing of changes 
made, and the ability to maintain and gain an advantage compared to one’s rivals.  
(3) The more consistent and stringent environment pollution control standards in Northern Europe 
and Scandinavia appear to have helped some of the European companies. The combination of strict, 
but transparent, standards and the economic downturn during the 1987-1993 period, lead to some 
European companies to implement a significant array of changes. Even among European companies, 
there are differences between the extent and  types of changes made. It appears that knowledge of 
the inter-linkages between the public policy rules and regulations and emerging market conditions 
vary across the firms. 
(4) There appears to be a perception that the nature of U.S. stock markets, at least at the margin, 
hinder large new investments, and investments in modernization in this industry. In part this seems 
to be related to the observation that in Europe, a larger fraction of stocks are held by large 
institutions and banks who may have a somewhat longer-run view of the markets, allowing firms to 
make costly, but necessary, investments.
9 
  Finally, we end with a big picture perspective on organizational behavior and change. One 
                                                           
9 These sentiments are echoed in: (1) the acquisition of Georgia-Pacific by the Koch group, and (2) 
Financial Times (June 26, 2007): “Quarterly guidance is at best a waste of resources and, more likely, a 
self-fulfilling exercise that attracts short-term traders,” says the report by the group, which was brought 
together by the Committee for Economic Development, a Washington think-tank. “A week ago, another 
coalition, masterminded by the Aspen Institute, issued a similar warning, saying US economic 
competitiveness was being harmed by companies’ near-term focus. That warning, first reported in the FT, 
echoed the concerns expressed by other groups of academics and business people, including one backed 
by Hank Paulson, Treasury secretary, in the past few months.” 
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particular issue in the spotlight is the significance of incremental efficiency gains, and there appears 
to be differences across firms in terms of how much they focus on this. To put matters in 
perspective, think of a typical paper-making machine used by some of the larger firms. The machine 
could be capable of producing about 800,000 tons of paper per year. This translates to about 2,192 
tons per day, or 91 tons per hour, or about 1.5 tons of paper per minute. This is a lot of paper. What 
this means is that errors in the production process (that may result in a bad batch of paper) are costly. 
First, an error implies a waste of inputs (chemicals, wood, energy, etc) that was used to produce the 
paper. Second, production of the paper resulted in environmental waste which needs to be cleaned 
up. Third, the paper that could not be used will now have to be recycled. All of this implies a very 
high premium for reducing errors. Investments in ICT (such as digital cameras, monitoring and 
recording systems that are centrally controlled) and the resulting changes in the firms’ organization 
structure (making it less hierarchial and giving the appropriate operations personnel the powers to 
alter the speed of the production process and make timely decisions) can provide significant cost-
savings to the firms. These ICT and related modernization investments need to be done in a timely 
manner, along with an extreme focus on tweaking out incremental efficiency gains. My observations 
on the broader role of ICT and organizational factors are consistent with those in the literature: e.g.,  
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) and Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002). 
 
9. Assessing Innovative Activity in Traditional Industries 
  In this final section, I discuss some of the complexities of measuring innovative activity in 
traditional industries such as pulp and paper. 
  Let us first examine some of the standard measures such as R&D expenditures and patents. If 
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we consider four of the largest firms – International Paper, Stora Enso, UPM Kymmene and 
Weyerhaeuser – their R&D intensity averaged approximately 0.4%. For the pulp and paper industry 
as a whole, the R&D intensity is approximately 0.6-0.7% Compare this to the following sector 
average R&D intensities: electrical and electronics 4-5%; Industrial engineering 2-3%; and software 
and computer services 10-11%. Another comparison is to Toyota in the automobile industry with a 
3.5-4% R&D intensity. In the manufacturing sector, pulp and paper has one of the lowest R&D 
intensities. In terms of total patent counts, the typical firm in this industry is associated with an 
average of 2-3 patents per year. Therefore, both patenting activity and R&D-intensity is low in this 
industry. Finally, as noted in Ghosal and Nair-Reichert (2009), inclusion of R&D and patents data in 
the estimated productivity equations (such as those reported in table 3) did not reveal any additional 
insights. This was mainly due to the very low levels of R&D intensities and typically low patent 
counts. 
  Part of this lack of innovation, as captured by the standard measures, relates to the fact that 
the industry is one of the most capital-intensive in manufacturing, and most of the technological 
advances are embedded in the machinery and equipment that the paper firms purchase from 
suppliers. This includes the main papermaking machine. 
  My visits to the paper mills in the four countries revealed that one needs to think more 
broadly about innovative activities in these types of traditional industries than simply focus on the 
standard measures related to R&D intensity and patents. 
  First, would be to measure the fraction of workers who have degrees in science and 
engineering. The production managers I talked to noted that they have a highly skilled workforce (in 
the sense that they have technical backgrounds). These workers, while not officially listed as R&D 
workers (as is the case in many industries), are responsible for examining the production processes 
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and suggesting changes that would improve the functioning of the processes, enhance the efficiency 
of operations and deliver cost-savings. 
  Second, many of the changes made by the firms related to changes in the organizational 
structure (such as changing the hierarchial decision-making structure) and restructuring of contracts 
in supply-chains and transportation. Some of these were detailed in section 4. Across all of my mill 
trips, the mill managers viewed these as crucial to improving efficiency of operations and staying 
competitive in a tough market. With this in mind, it would be useful to think about innovations in 
organizational structure and contractual relationships. Obtaining data on these will undoubtedly be 
difficult, but detailed firm-specific studies can provide key insights.  
 
 
  39 Ghosal: Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization 
References 
Audretsch D. 1995. Innovation and Industry Evolution. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Barsky J. 1999. Forest industry harvests a green future: voluntary investments in technology are 
setting environmental example. News World Communications, Inc. 
 
Bjorkman A, Paun D, Jacobs-Young C. 1997. Financial performance, capital expenditures, and 
international activities of the North American pulp and paper industry at mid-decade. The TAPPI 
Journal 80: 71-84. 
 
Bresnahan T, Brynjolfsson E, Hitt LM. 2002. Information Technology, Workplace 
Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 117, 339-376. 
 
Brynjolfsson E, Hitt L, Yang S. 2002. Intangible Assets: Computers and Organizational 
Capital,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
 
Denrell J, Fang C, Winter SG. 2003. The economics of strategic opportunity. Strategic Management 
Journal 24: 977–990. 
 
Dierickx I, Cool KO. 1989. Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage. 
Management Science 35, 1504–1511. 
 
Dixit A. 1980. The role of investment in entry deterrence. Economic Journal 9: 95-106. 
 
Drucker P. 1995. Managing in a Time of Change. Truman Talley: New York. 
 
Ghosal V. 2002. Potential foreign competition in U.S. manufacturing. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 20: 1461-1489. 
 
Ghosal, V. 2008. Small is Beautiful but Size Matters: The Asymmetric Impact of Uncertainty and 
Sunk Costs on Small and Large Businesses. Georgia Institute of Technology. 
 
Ghosal V, Nair-Reichert U. 2009. Investments in modernization, innovation and gains in 
productivity: evidence from firms in the global paper industry. Research Policy, 2009, 536-547.   
 
Gort M, Klepper S. 1982. Time paths in the diffusion of product innovations. Economic Journal 92: 
630-653. 
 
Harrison K. 2002. Ideas and environmental standard setting: a comparative study of regulation in the 
pulp and paper industry. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and 
Institutions 15: 69-96. 
 
Ince PJ. 1999. Global cycle changes the rules for U.S. pulp and paper. Industry Review. 
Jovanovic B, MacDonald G. 1994. “The Life Cycle of a Competitive Industry,” Journal of Political 
 
  40 Ghosal: Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization 
Economy, 322-347. 
 
Klepper S. 1996. “Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the Product Life Cycle,” American 
Economic Review 86, 562-583. 
 
Klepper S, Graddy E. 1990. “The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants of Market 
Structure,” The RAND Journal of Economics 21, 27–44. 
 
Li H, McCarthy P, Urmanbetova A. 2004. Containerboard industry review: 1970-2000. Center for 
Paper Business and Industry Studies. 
 
McNutt James. 2002. The paper industry. Presentation at the Sloan workshop on globalization. 
 
Norberg-Bohm V, Rossi M. 1998. Power of incrementalism: environmental regulation and 
technological change  in pulp and paper beaching in the U.S. Technology Analysis and Strategic 
Management 10: 225-45. 
 
Pesendorfer M. 2003. Horizontal mergers in the paper industry. RAND Journal of Economics 
34: 495–515. 
 
Pulp and Paper North American Factbook. 2001. Paperloop Publications. 
 
Spender JC, Grant R. 1996. Knowledge and the firm: overview. Strategic Management Journal, 
Winter Special Issue 17: 5–9. 
 
Teece DJ, Pisano G, Sheen A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic 
Management Journal 18: 509-533. 
 
Zott C. 2003. Dynamic capabilities and the emergence of intra-industry differential firm 
performance: insights from a simulation study. Strategic Management Journal 24: 97–125. 
 
  41 Ghosal: Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization 
 




America EU  25 
1987 3.37  3.39 2.84
1988 3.68  3.44 2.78
1989 4.55  4.19 4.10
1990 3.68  3.47 3.29
1991 2.81  1.76 2.33
1992 1.45  -0.31 0.61
1993 2.11  3.15 0.84
1994 1.79  2.65 -0.19
1995 3.26  4.07 2.98
1996 2.90  2.52 2.79
1997 3.36  3.56 1.88
1998 3.70  4.48 2.72
Note: Data are from the World Bank statistical tables. 
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Table 2. Selected firm-specific variables 
Time-period: 1994-1998 





A. Mainly paper, pulp and related        
1. International Paper (paper, pulp, packaging, forest products)  USA  105 (9)  141 (3)  41 (4) 
2. Weyerhaueser (paper, pulp, packaging)  USA  130 (8)  184 (8)  46 (3) 
3. Georgia-Pacific (paper, pulp, wood products, chemicals)  USA  90 (7)  171 (6)  36 (5) 
4. Willamette (white paper, brown paper, building materials)  USA  152 (22)  163 (8)  30 (4) 
5. Stora Enso (paper, pulp, packaging, wood products) 4.71  Finland  175 (9)  179 (10)  NA 
6. UPM Kymmene (paper, pulp, packaging, wood products)  Finland  133 (12)  159 (13)  17 (2) 
7. Norske Skog Canada (paper, pulp)  Canada  277 (51)  151 (14)  NA 
8. Wausau Paper (paper, pulp)  USA  105 (8)  171 (7)  19 (1) 
9. Longview Fibre (paper, pulp, packaging, wood products)  USA  148 (8)  130 (14)  16 (2) 
10. Badger Paper Mills (paper, pulp)  USA  47 (5)  123 (8)  11 (3) 
11. Abitibi (paper, pulp, wood products)  Canada  75 (19)  101 (23)  30 (13) 
12. Bowater (paper, pulp, wood products)  USA  235 (6)  186 (35)  38 (8) 
13. Schweitzer Mauduit (paper, pulp)*  USA  46 (5)  106 (11)  23 (9) 
14. Domtar (paper, pulp, wood products)  Canada  82 (4)  80 (16)  7 (1) 
15. Tembec (paper, pulp, packaging, wood products)  Canada  185 (21)  116 (6)  NA 
16. Glatfelter (paper, pulp, composite laminates)  USA  94 (7)  112 (6)  17 (2) 
17. Holmen (paper, packaging, timber products)  Sweden  296 (21)  180 (12)  NA 
        
B. Others        
1. Kimberly Clark (tissues and related)  USA  65 (6)  132 (13)  40 (10) 
2. Caraustar Industries (paperboard, packaging)  USA  34 (5)  85 (2)  25 (5) 
3. Aracruz Celulose (market pulp)*  Brazil  380 (38)  120 (24)  12 (4) 
4. Smurfit-Stone (packaging, corrugated containers)  USA  70 (11)  115 (36)  15 (2) 
5. Svenska Celulosa (tissue, packaging, pulp, forest products)  Sweden  99 (9)  144 (18)  23 (1) 
6. MeadWestvaco (packaging, paper, chemicals)  USA  150 (17)  136 (9)  28 (3) 
7. Potlatch (packaging, wood products)  USA  160 (4)  139 (4)  42 (2) 
8. Rock-Tenn (packaging, paperboard)  USA  33 (5)  82 (4)  16 (2) 
9. Temple-Inland (packaging, building)  USA  112 (4)  135 (7)  51 (6) 
10. Cascades (packaging, tissue, paper, molded plastics)  Canada  80 (12)  99 (18)  8 (2) 
Notes: 
1. The data are from Compustat. NA denotes that data were not available. 
2. The numbers are the mean (standard deviation) for each variable for each firm over the 1994-1998 period. 
3. Group A consist of 17 companies (in no particular order) that mainly produce various types of paper, pulp, some 
packaging, and related wood products. Group B contains a more diverse set of 10 companies (in no particular order) that 
specialize in one or more of the following products: packaging, paperboard, tissues, selected building materials, market 
pulp, timber products. While some of the companies in Group A produce products common to Group B companies – e.g., 
packaging, timber products, etc – they form a “relatively” more homogenous group compared to the companies in Group 
B. Given the business and product lines of the companies in Group A, it is not possible difficult to create a group of 
companies that produce only pulp and paper. 
4. Variables: 
  Capital-labor ratio = real capital (plant, property and equipment) divided by total employees 
  Labor productivity = real sales divided by total employees 
5. Comments on firms labeled with a *: data for Schweitzer Mauduit are from 1995-1998; data for Aracruz Celulose are 
from 1994-1996.  
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1. These estimates are from Ghosal and Nair-Reichert (2009). The sample of firms used to obtain the estimates in this 
table are different from the sample of firms presented in Table 2. The ‘investment transactions’ variables are defined as 
follows: row 4 shows the total number of investment transactions; row 5 the number of investment transactions classified 
as mechanical; row 6 are transactions in the digital category (this includes ICT, digital recording devices, etc); and row 7 
are transaction sin the chemical category. 
2. Patents and mergers are not measured in logarithms. All other variables are measured in logarithms. 
3. t-statistics computed from heteroscedasticity-consistent standard-errors are in parentheses. An asterisk * denotes 
statistical significance at least at the 10% level.  
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